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Moving Beyond “Illiberal Democracy” in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Recalling the Significance of Local Governance 
 
By Christopher LaMonica 
 
Introduction: Fareed Zakaria’s Challenge to Africanists  
In a provocative article entitled “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” published nearly a decade 
ago, Fareed Zakaria convincingly argued that, despite holding formal elections, liberal 
democratic practice in most of the world’s newly declared “democracies” remained elusive.1 
Zakaria warned that the holding of formal elections would now confer the formal title of 
“democracy” to a number of states but that many of them should not be thought of as classically 
liberal or free democracies in the sense of guaranteeing Lockean liberties and permitting the 
unhindered alteration of power. Citing the Freedom House’s 1996–97 survey, Freedom in the 
World, Zakaria argued: 
Illiberal democracy is a growth industry. Seven years ago only 22 percent of the 
democratizing countries could have been so characterized; five years ago that figure had 
risen to 35 percent. And to date few illiberal democracies have matured into liberal 
democracies; if anything, they are moving toward heightened illberalism.2  
Zakaria was asking us all to think critically of the sudden rise of democratic elections 
taking place in the post-Cold War context; something that could undoubtedly have profound 
implications for interpreting political realities in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past decade, 
however, Africanists have been slow to respond to this new political reality. It is in response to 
Zakaria’s challenge, then, that this article is written but with a new caveat: for liberal democracy 
to be realized in sub-Saharan Africa, policymakers at all levels must place a renewed emphasis 
on local governance. 
Post-Cold War Realities in Sub-Saharan Africa (According to Africanists!) 
The end of Cold War patronage has had dramatic policy implications for sub-Saharan Africa. 
First, the kinds of support that corrupt African state leaders had come to rely on is now gone, 
leaving them decidedly less at ease. Today all of Africa’s leaders are well aware of a new 
political reality: Cold War ideology can no longer be used as a basis for United States, Soviet, or 
                                                
1 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76 (1997). Zakaria uses the term 
“liberal” in the classic sense of the term, i.e., political freedom. In the United States context, of course, the term 
“liberal” has taken on another meaning in recent decades, which means much the opposite: using the state to 
promote social equity through social services, welfare programs, and the like. It is Zakaria’s use of the term that I 
have in mind throughout. Here, political liberalization refers to “political freedom” (the protection of political rights 
and civil liberties), which is to be distinguished from economic liberalization, meaning the freeing up of markets.  
2 Ibid., 24. 
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other state support. What this could mean for the people of Africa is that, now, there is yet 
another possibility for democratic hope; the kind of hope proponents of democratization have 
long had for the African continent. Unfortunately, to date, a good number of Africanists have 
continued their long-established pattern of remaining focused on politics at the central 
government level. Moreover, many are repeating the error that occurred during the era of 
Africa’s “first independence”: interpreting events in an overly optimistic and, in the end, quite 
superficial manner.  
Of course, Africanists of all political perspectives have maintained that the first real 
democratic hope for sub-Saharan Africa came with decolonization—with the “Year of Africa”: 
1960—when thirteen African states gained their independence; from France: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte D’Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and the Republic of the Congo; from the UK: Nigeria and 
Somalia; from Belgium: the Democratic Republic of Congo. Others were soon to follow suit. 
Many scholars, such as the young Immanuel Wallerstein, were thrilled to partake in these great 
historical events and wrote of them with great optimism.3 In the decades that followed, however, 
the subject of African politics was decidedly less popular among scholars. Even that previous 
generation—that had expressed so much optimism in the 1950s and 1960s—now deemed 
African studies as, somehow, less appealing or irrelevalent. In the words of former Africanist 
Gavin Kitching, for example, African studies was “too depressing,” as he carefully explained the 
matter in a 2000 issue of the African Studies Review & Newsletter.4 And Wallerstein, who has 
similarly moved on to other areas of academic inquiry, now considers his optimistic language of 
the time to be unwarranted.5 
The same can be said of the optimistic observations made by many observers of African 
politics in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War—what Colin Legum referred to as Africa’s 
“Second Independence.”6 Writing for the Journal of Democracy, for example, Richard Joseph 
declared in 1991: “It is conceivable that by 1992 the continent will be overwhelmingly 
democratic in composition.”7 Carol Lancaster was similarly upbeat in an article written for 
Foreign Policy, noting that “three-fourths of the 47 countries south of the Sahara are in various 
stages of political liberalization.”8 The primary reason for these Africanists’ optimism was that 
democratic elections were suddenly taking place across the African continent after decades of 
                                                
3 See, e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (New York: Random House, 1961), 
and Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967). 
4 Gavin Kitching, “Why I Gave Up African Studies,” African Studies Review & Newsletter 22, 1 (June 2000), 
21–26. 
5 Immanuel Wallerstein, “What Hope Africa? What Hope World?” in After Liberalism (New York: The New 
Press, 1995), 46–69. 
6 Colin Legum, “The Coming of Africa’s Second Independence,” Washington Quarterly 13, 1 (December 
1990). 
7 Richard Joseph, “Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom,” Journal of Democracy 2 (1991), 32. 
8 Carol Lancaster, “Democracy in Africa,” Foreign Policy 85 (Winter 1991–92), 148. 
Moving Beyond “Illiberal Democracy” in Sub-Saharan Africa     3 
single-party and/or autocratic rule. Yet, just a few years later, doubts were being expressed about 
the “wave of democratization” that was taking place, not only in Africa, but across the globe. It 
was in 1997 that Zakaria famously remarked: “We see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon—
illiberal democracy.” He explains: “It has been difficult to recognize the problem because for 
almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy—a political system 
marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by rule of law, a separation of powers, and 
the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.”9 Zakaria’s crucial 
insight, that has clear implications for today’s new democratic states, is that liberalism is 
“theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy.”10 
It could be argued that today the vague term of democratization, arguably still in vogue in 
some circles, is gradually being replaced by the notion of democracy alongside political 
liberalization—something that, for many, is more meaningful and more easily subjected to 
scrutiny and measurement. This is because, as Zakaria points out, the sine qua non of democracy 
is, indeed, elections; and now that most of sub-Saharan African states are holding elections, they 
can be called formal “democracies.” But there can be little doubt that observers of African 
politics have always had more in mind, when speaking of democratization, than the formal 
process of democratic elections. Many of the aforementioned observers of African politics were 
thinking not only of “democracy,” but also the prospects for political liberalization. This post-
Cold War concern is not only more “refined” than what was typically argued during the Cold 
War; it has also made countless observers more sensitive to the need for local institutional 
support for liberal and other policy aims, such as improved health care and education. 
Neocolonial norms, that have prioritized the whims of those in central government, have for 
decades dominated the political culture in Africa. Rather than assign part of the responsibility to 
external patronage, which helped to create the conditions for political monsters like Desiré 
Mobutu, Africanists were freely writing about a “unique” form of African political leadership 
that was patrimonial, patriarchical, etc. in form. Harvard’s Martin Kilson and Robert I. Rotberg 
are prime examples of Africanist scholars who based their entire careers on critiquing African 
leadership. As early as 1963, Kilson was pessimistically describing the “patrimonial,” “neo-
patrimonial,” “patriarchical,” “authoritarian and single-party tendencies in African politics” and 
Rotberg (now pessimistically questioning China’s “real motives” in Africa) has been a consistent 
contributor to the “irresponsible” and “corrupt” African leader angle.11 In a 2004 contribution to 
Foreign Affairs he writes, for example, “Africa has long been saddled with poor, even 
malevolent, leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates, 
                                                
9 Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” 22. 
10 Ibid., 22–23. Emphasis mine. 
11 Martin Kilson, “Authoritarian and Single-Party Tendencies in Africa,” World Politics 15, 2 (January 1963); 
Rotberg’s publications are numerous and ongoing. On April 22, 2010 the author attended Rotberg’s keynote speech 
for a conference entitled “The New Scramble for Africa? Contemporary Formations Between China & Africa,” 
wherein, again, he pessimistically portrayed African politicians, and in this case, questioned Chinese motives for 
involvement in African affairs—another career-safe perspective that most Africanists have taken of late. 
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and puffed-up posturers.”12 Most of today’s post-Cold War Africa scholars have followed this 
career-safe pessimistic way of interpreting African realities, whereby the problems within Africa 
are portrayed as being entirely due to the internal shortcomings of Africa and/or Africans.  
To continue along the path of one-sided pessimism, I submit, is not only inaccurate, it is 
irresponsible scholarship: good for careers in political science but hardly an accurate description 
of Africa’s political realities, past and present. Further, postcolonial scholarship—similarly 
pessimistic in tone—is certainly closer to the mark, in that it emphasizes external influences on 
virtually every aspect of African life, but it can overemphasize the external and neglect internal 
solutions to African woes.13 To be clear: the phenomena that Kilson, Rotberg, and other experts 
describe do and have existed in Africa, but they cannot be attributed to only local politics and 
politicians. As Peter Schraeder has emphasized, responsibility for the lack of checks and 
balances in modern African contexts cannot be the portrayed as a uniquely African creation: 
African political failures are and have been greatly influenced by external forces.14 Moreover, 
Africanists’ tendencies (indeed!) to make generalizations about African political realities based 
only on central government observations have only further aggravated the distortions that lead to 
misunderstanding.  
As part of an effort to correct these distortions, the next generation of Africanists needs to 
have a more balanced perspective on the significance of both internal and external capabilities 
and influences, and to re-focus its energies on matters of local government. The careful attention 
to local governance by colonial observers of African politics, such as Lord Hailey, was 
problematic in the sense that it prioritized the interests and racial attitudes of the British Colonial 
Office. In retrospect, however, it was of crucial significance to achieving liberal democratic 
governance in African contexts.15 While external pressures and agendas will likely continue to 
have an impact on African political realities, we must all recall the significance of local 
participation and input, as they are the best ways to take steps toward a locally defined 
understanding of political liberalism.16 Lost in the overly optimistic (1960s and 1990s) and 
                                                
12 Robert I. Rotberg, “Strengthening African Leadership,” Foreign Affairs 83, 4 (July–August 2004), 14. 
13 This author greatly values the important contributions of postcolonial scholars such as Franz Fanon, O. 
Mannoni, Aimé Césaire, Albert Memmi, Edward Said, and countless others.  
14 Peter J. Schraeder, African Politics and Society, 2nd ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004), 66. 
15 Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1957, orig. pub. 1938) is, while 
problematic, significant and comprehensive (1,676 pages and maps devoted to the topic of local governance). I 
recently purchased a “discarded” library copy of the book for $3.00, which is an indication of today’s lack of interest 
in such works. The problem I am attempting to emphasize here is the subsequent marginalization of local 
governance in African political contexts. Solid and warranted critiques of the British colonial era are many. Of Lord 
Hailey in particular, see Suke Wolton, Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office, and the Politics of Race in the Second 
World War (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 
16 Understandably, there have been growing concerns about the form that “democracy” and/or “liberalism” 
might take in Africa. See, e.g., J. Shola Omotola, “Attractions and Limitations of Liberal Democracy in Africa,” 
Africana 3, 1 (December 2009). 
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pessimistic literature of all kinds (ongoing, postcolonial left and corrupt-leadership-focused 
right) has been the crucial importance of local governance.  
In recent years the process of strengthening local government institutions in sub-Saharan 
African contexts has been viewed, largely within the context of internal “decentralization 
policies,” as a drain on central government resources and power; it need not be. Proponents of 
such zero-sum views assume that the functioning of local governments takes place at the expense 
of central government authority and control. That Africa’s central government leaders have 
tended to hold onto central government political power is nothing new; what is dramatically 
different in the post-Cold War context is that external Cold War patronage, that tended to support 
central over local government leadership, is now over. This new environment has already led to 
highly publicized political reforms, including the aforementioned “wave of democracy.” Yet, as 
indicated above, most observers of African politics remain focused on central government 
events. As occurred in the history of today’s liberal democratic states, improvements in what 
Zakaria terms political liberalization—or what has been loosely called “democratization”—will 
require a renewed emphasis on, and vigorous attention to, local governance issues; in the African 
context, however, this will also require careful attention to both the internal and external levels 
of policymaking.  
Making Historical Comparisons 
Although today’s politically liberal states do have differences among them as to how central and 
local governments function, the assumption among them is that, there are at least some positive-
sum gains to be had among local and central governments. Considerations of these local-central 
government relationships, not only at present, but in history, do matter to the realization of 
political liberalism in all contexts. And one should not shy away from making historical 
comparisons of yesterday’s liberalization experience to the circumstances of today’s liberalizing 
states.  
Of course, the promise of all democratic states is that they are an important step toward 
the expression of the “will of the people” in politics. For a variety of reasons that will has been 
denied, time and again, in African contexts due to powers that extend well beyond African 
borders. And it is important to remember that local norms and cultures, in African and other 
“developing state” contexts, can be compatible with democratic forms of governance. Time and 
again, the basic notion that democratic norms were found in African and “other,” i.e., non-
western, contexts is brought up by anthropologists and political observers alike but, just as 
regularly they are systematically ignored. After a lifelong consideration of what “democracy” 
might mean in African contexts, anthropologist Maxwell Owusu concludes: “We now know … 
that free and fair elections must be linked with reasonable economic security for every citizen.”17 
The essential point that Owusu makes is that democratic ideas are and have always been present 
in African contexts; the impediments to their realization lie elsewhere: local security concerns, 
etc.18 Similar arguments are found in Asian contexts. Kim Dae Jung has commented, for 
                                                
17 Maxwell Owusu, “Democracy and Africa—A View from the Village,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 30, 3 (September 1992), 372.  
18 A point also emphasized by Robert H. Bates, Prosperity and Violence (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 
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example, that “long before Locke” democratic liberal ideals existed in Asia and many other parts 
of the world—not only the West; the problem has been that these ideals have been held back by 
authoritarian forms of governance and rule.19  
If one is to consider the words of Africa’s colonial administrators, or even much of the 
political science literature on Africa, there is indeed a focus on order—even if under 
authoritarian rule—before democracy. This priority of order in sub-Saharan Africa has been the 
“justified” policy priority of the powerful in Africa’s recent history and has clearly been viewed 
in a much different light among the ruled, as brilliantly discussed by Mahmood Mamdani. In his 
view, democratization “became a top-down agenda enforced on the peasantry.”20 “Without a 
reform of the local state,” he argues, “democratization will remain not only superficial but 
explosive.”21 
A comparative consideration of the historical expectations of the public in all pre-liberal 
contexts, as to what local governments could reasonably achieve, can be revealing. What, for 
example, was the expected role of local government authorities in pre-liberal France, Germany, 
Italy, or the United States? Certainly in those historical contexts there was much, often well-
founded, suspicion of local wardens of the state. Collection of tax and the inconsistent use of 
coercive force gave ample reason for public angst over local state authorities in all of these pre-
liberal contexts. But in terms of the provision of a public service, the primary expectation of the 
public was that the state would help to deter violence; what at least some early Western theorists 
equated with improved social order. Perhaps the best-known “classic” example is that of 
seventeenth-century political theorist Thomas Hobbes who argued that, without a state, society 
would be unruly, as “the state of nature is the state of war.”22 Worth repeating is that the need for 
“order” in African and other developing country contexts, before political liberalization can take 
place, was similarly emphasized by political theorists of the post-independence era of the 1950s 
and 60s. In the 1968 book, Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington famously 
argued that “political decay” was to be temporarily expected in developing state contexts as they 
liberalize. Disorder, Huntington argued, was part of the process of change. In retrospect, of 
course, such arguments can be seen as providing excuses for delaying progress towards political 
liberalization; the human reality since that initial period of optimism for African political change 
has been decreasing standards of living throughout the sub-Saharan African region. And, in 
retrospect, while the impediments were many, the years that followed the hopeful wave of 
African independence movements provided scant evidence of political liberalization on the 
African continent. A process that began with great optimism for the peoples of Africa led many, 
within just a few years, to great disappointment. 
                                                
19 Kim Dae Jung, “The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” Foreign Affairs, Agenda 1995 (New York: 
Foreign Affairs, 1995).  
20 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 288.  
21 Ibid., 289. 
22 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (1651).  
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In the aftermath then, of Africa’s First Independence (the end of the colonial era) and, 
now, Africa’s Second Independence (the end of the Cold War), political liberalization has 
remained elusive. Many political scientists, of the left and right, who had been so optimistic at 
the outset, now deem African development as a lost cause; so discouraged by events of recent 
decades, some Africanists have simply chosen to walk away from the study of Africa.23 Among 
those who have remained, there seems to be a focus on either the development of an African 
“civil society” (bottom-up) or a change in African “leadership” (top-down). Yet neither of these 
groups, roughly representing the Western political left and right, respectively, dares to make 
direct historical comparisons based on the practical underpinnings of liberal practice. Instead, 
ideological assumptions that they might have about political development anywhere are simply 
transferred to their observations about politics in Africa. The one group of theorists that does 
emphasize historical circumstances, the Historical Structuralists (Marxist-Leninists), have 
generally deemed Africa’s developmental circumstances as a kind of lost cause due to the nature 
of the global capitalist system. In fact, the very idea that comparisons of political development 
North-to-South, or developed states versus LDCs (less developed countries), can and should be 
made has been largely discredited due to the earlier works of Modernization theorists, such as 
Daniel Lerner or Walter Rostow.24 Debates on the matter of political development are, in a 
sense, blocked. On the one hand, many Africanists simply dismiss direct comparisons of political 
behavior and experience as “modernization theory” and/or dismiss the prospects for African 
development because of the global capitalist system. On the other hand, African citizens 
themselves are losing any faith in “democracy” that they might have had just a few years ago, 
often conflating the meanings of democracy, democratization, and liberalism. 
Today, we must address the shortcomings of formal “democracy” and turn our attention 
to the role of governing institutions at supporting liberalism. This will require true historical 
comparisons that have thus far eluded the field of African area studies and mainstream 
comparative politics. But there are a few examples of this kind of effort. For instance, it is 
undoubtedly with African political development in mind that Africanist Robert Bates discusses 
the structure and purpose of Europe’s pre-liberal governing institutions in his 2001 book, 
Prosperity and Violence. For him, as with Hobbes, the original purpose of governing institutions 
was to control violence and, in history, this was most visible at the local level. “Political 
development,” Bates argues, “occurs when people domesticate violence.… Coercion becomes 
productive when it is employed not to seize or to destroy wealth, but rather to safeguard and 
promote its creation.”25 For Bates, Europe’s pre-liberal governing institutions, by helping to 
deter violence, in turn, aided European development. Again, with African development clearly 
on his mind, he argues rather provocatively, “Societies that are now urban, industrial and 
wealthy were themselves once rural, agrarian and poor.”26 To his credit, Bates does emphasize 
                                                
23 Kitching, “Why I Gave Up African Studies.” 
24 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1958); Walter W. Rostow, The 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
25 Robert H. Bates, Prosperity and Violence, 101–102. 
26 Ibid., 21. 
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the centrality of local government to political development in history. But like others, Bates 
ignores the link between local government development and the new, and historically significant, 
external influences on development. That is, local governance in sub-Saharan Africa has been 
dramatically affected by the dictates of outside (colonial, Cold War, etc.) actors; the same could 
not be said of the medieval European village. Historical structuralists are right to emphasize the 
role of history but, like all schools of thought, the emphasis tends to be on “state”—writ large—
development. 
Like the neoinstitutionalists, Bates importantly brings the focus back to the local level 
(with the understanding of its centrality to the African context) but his focus is on economic over 
political development.27 Looking at data from medieval and early modern Europe Bates argues 
that, over time, while violence was certainly not eradicated, functioning government structures 
were developed and “prosperity” resulted. That is, along with a growing sense of security and 
order among the masses, average incomes rose. As stated, similar arguments were made in the 
1960s, notably by Huntington,28 i.e., that order is a necessary precursor to democratic 
development. But Bates’ work focuses less on the provision of government services and more on 
the requirements of members of society. The eminent Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal 
similarly argued: “Even an authoritarian regime cannot record major achievements unless it can 
somehow mobilize acceptance, participation, and cooperation among the people.”29 Democratic 
states did ultimately flourish in the European context but it may well have been the citizen 
demand for liberalism that made this possible, i.e., the internal policy environment. Again, 
importantly, in contrast with today’s internal policy environments in sub-Saharan Africa, 
medieval local government development faced fewer challenges from external actors. 
In spite of Zakaria’s 1997 warning of the rise of “illiberal democratic” conditions, the 
distinction between democracy and liberalism remains elusive among many in external policy 
environments. For example, in a 2004 article entitled “Why Democracies Excel” Joseph T. 
Siegle, et al., provide a variety of statistics to make the point that democratic states outperform 
autocratic states in virtually every category of developmental change: economic growth, quality 
of life indices, and avoidance of humanitarian crises. In other words, they conflate the two: 
liberalism and democracy. However, their argument still represents an important step away from 
Huntington’s 1968 argument that “political decay” is only part of the process of change and that 
authoritarian regimes may be a kind of necessary evil as they promote “order” amidst chaos. 
That is, the policy of “order over democracy” may not be as valid as previously thought; 
democratic states do consistently outperform “orderly” autocratic or military forms of 
                                                
27 For similar neo-institutionalist arguments see, in particular, Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, 
The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976);  
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), and Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
28 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 
29 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, ed. Seth S. King (London: Penguin 
1971), 35. 
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governance. Siegle, et al., conclude that we must reject all “development first, democracy later” 
approaches, particularly when it comes to foreign aid.30 In this, they are probably right yet 
nowhere do they mention local governance, nor do they ever distinguish between democracy and 
liberalism—as Zakaria warns, the two are simply conflated. Moreover, one can only assume that 
their revised plan still involves central over local government leadership. 
Thus far the internal demand side of the debates on democratization has generally been 
portrayed in terms of “civil society.” The prevailing logic of civil society proponents is that 
improved livelihoods, at the individual and local level, will lead to a variety of developmental 
improvements including political protest that will eventually take place within the political 
system. In African contexts they have generally argued in terms of developing the demands of 
individuals and local representatives so that they may act, collectively, as a safeguard over 
otherwise authoritarian forms of government. This makes good theoretical sense but the efforts 
to improve livelihoods at the local level generally have little to do with Lockean ideals.31 
Instead, discussions of civil society are overwhelmingly oriented toward the policy debates 
within “developmental circles” that relate, specifically, to the provision of public services, such 
as water and electricity. While the provision of these public services is undoubtedly a 
meritorious venture, it is unclear that today’s successful democracies developed in such a 
fashion. Policy debates on democratization, framed either as an ideological quest or as a 
desperate call for water or electricity, are importantly neglecting the historical underpinnings of 
liberalism.  
The hard fact is that democratic elections are limited in their impact. Further, in today’s 
African context, a fundamental truth is that “democracy,” as with previous forms of government, 
has been handed down from above without any political struggle by a large section of the people. 
While the media might portray urban protests as a positive sign of political struggle, it is clear 
that the majority of sub-Saharan African citizens reside in the countryside where the kind of 
coordination required for effective political protest is generally lacking. This, in fact, may be 
very analogous to what happened in early democracies, where urban protest (later documented 
by historians) was where the debates of political theory took place, while the masses in the rural 
countryside were largely removed from the process. “Democracy,” in other words, can be 
thought of as an arrangement of the elites to keep the masses contented; all the while, liberalism 
is what the masses cared most about. “Democracy,” thought another way, was how then reigning 
elites maintained order, while simultaneously disposing of monarchy—obviously a direct interest 
                                                
30 Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein and Morton H. Halperin, “Why Democracies Excel,” Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 5 (2004), 57-71. 
31 The same can be said of any local governance arrangements of the colonial period. Africanists often 
emphasize the differences among British (Indirect Rule), French (Assimilation), and other colonizers’ approaches to 
local governance in sub-Saharan African history. But Lockean aims were clearly not the priority of any colonizer. 
Rather, the overarching concern was the maintenance of “order.” Colonial administrators were also, generally, 
concerned with the prospect of tax revenue, and the protection of colonial “interests” (protection of entrepreneurs, 
missionaries, etc.) See, e.g., Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Colonial Office 
(London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1951).  
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of elites who were to take over political power. Faced with an opportunity for establishing liberal 
state practice, elites were keen to do so, as it protected their own property (thereby avoiding 
disorder), but it also appealed to the masses in ways that Bates refers to (avoidance of violence) 
and, gradually, a sense of new possibilities for the future. In early democratic states then, as in 
new democratic states today, the vast majority of rural and urban residents continues to focus on 
day-to-day struggle and, if anything, generally has remained politically apathetic and disunited. 
This reality is not unique to Africa. Democracy is an important step toward political legitimacy 
but it is not what heightens the interests of the elites or the masses in their respective futures; 
liberalism does.  
The very fact that individual citizens have no real avenue to pursue effective protest is 
undoubtedly disappointing to many but the disappointment, it must be acknowledged, stems 
from broader theoretical preconceptions of the historical development of democracy. Both 
Western and Marxist models of political development see promise in protest, in the “rising up” 
of peoples, in an effort to hold their political and/or industrial leaders more accountable. But 
democracy is not a panacea as can be seen in the case of the Ancient Greeks, where the masses 
were generally kept outside of any democratic experiment.  
It would not be an exaggeration to say that this model was carried over into the 
democratic developments that took place in Europe and America. In fact, scholars such as 
Charles A. Beard and Richard Hofstadter provocatively argue that the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 were highly critical, even fearful, of 
democracy. According to Beard, the notes of James Madison, which have proven crucial to 
scholars’ understanding of what was discussed at the convention, show conclusively that  
the members of that assembly were not seeking to rationalize any fine notions about 
democracy and equality, but were striving with all the resources of political wisdom at 
their command to set up a system of government that would be stable and efficient, 
safeguarded on the one hand against the possibilities of despotism and on the other 
against the onslaught of majorities.32 
Governor Morris, who was present at the Convention, confirms Beard’s conclusion: “An 
aristocratic body [which he defined as ‘men of great established property—aristocracy] will keep 
down the turbulence of democracy.”33 According to Madison’s notes Elbridge Gerry and others 
warned of the evils that could be experienced “from the excess of democracy.”34 Writing on the 
prevailing logic of America’s Founding Fathers, Richard Hofstadter similarly explains  
To protect property is only to protect men in the exercise of their natural faculties. 
Among the many liberties, therefore, freedom to hold and dispose of property is 
paramount. Democracy, unchecked rule of the masses, is sure to bring about arbitrary 
redistribution of property, destroying the very essence of liberty.35  
                                                
32 Charles Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 140. 
33 Governor Morris, quoted in ibid., 141. 
34 Elbridge Gerry, quoted in ibid., 140. 
35 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage, 1948), 12. 
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It is important to note that Beard was attempting to demonstrate the economic logic 
behind the U.S. Constitution and his work, therefore, was deemed by many within Western states 
(and particularly within the United States) to be Marxist. To many, Hofstadter similarly appears 
to be overly critical of the U.S. democratic experiment. During much of the twentieth-century, 
because they both downplayed idealistic understandings of the development of “democracy,” 
both of these scholars appeared unpatriotic to many. In particular, linking economic 
considerations with politics was thought of as leftist at best, Marxist at worst. For example, the 
works of Howard Zinn have been deemed unpatriotic or Marxist because of his emphasis on the 
political concerns of the “masses.”36 With the ideological fervor that characterized much of the 
Cold War now over, a reconsideration of these views may be in order. Admittedly some have 
simply opted to label the works of Hofstadter, Zinn, and others as unpatriotic, Marxist, 
communist and the like. Today, however, it is hardly controversial to say that economic 
considerations are an important part of politics and policy analysis. Conservatives in the United 
States context regularly intertwine the economic with the political, as Marx might have done, yet 
no one would dare label their ideas as “Marxist!” For example, CNN quotes Condoleeza Rice as 
saying: “Economics and security are inextricably linked” and countless others—notably Henry 
Kissinger—have made similar comments throughout their careers.37 Indeed, with the passing of 
this ideological block may well come a clearer understanding of the underpinnings of Western 
political liberalism—that are in fact linked to matters of security (as argued by Bates) and 
economics (as argued by Owusu)—which may help provide important clues for the development 
of today’s new African democracies. 
Upon reflection it is clear that the average democratic citizen in history has been less 
interested in theoretical democracy than in the day-to-day struggle for survival. This does not 
detract from the overwhelming virtue of democracy over other forms of government; the point is 
to emphasize the practical concerns of citizens at the local level. At this level of analysis, the 
individual’s struggle for political liberalism, viewed in terms of citizen demand, can be 
revealing. To the average citizen of pre-democratic and democratic states alike, the state did help 
to deter random acts of violence, but it also helped legitimize claims to private property 
ownership, a cornerstone of Western understandings of political liberalism. Because of their 
geographic proximity, at a time when traveling great distances was especially uncommon, local 
governments also fostered ties with the central government through, for example, collection of 
state tax or tribute and, ultimately, in matters of security. As Bates has argued, contact with the 
state was considered worthy insofar as the state authorities provided a sense of protection from 
                                                
36 Notably, Zinn’s international best seller, A Peoples History of the United States (New York: Harper 
Perrenial, 2003). In response to Zinn’s book a “corrective” effort has been written by Larry Schweikart and Michael 
Allen, A Patriot’s History of the United States (New York: Sentinnel, 2010)—at the time of writing a New York 
Times best seller.  Sentinnel is described as “a dedicated conservative imprint within Penguin Group (USA) Inc.” on 
the http://us.penguingroup.com web-page (accessed October 4, 2010). 
37 See Sgt. 1st Class Doug Sample, “President's Trip to Asia and Australia to Stress Security and 
Cooperation,” American Forces Press Service, October 15, 2003, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. 
aspx?id=28319 (accessed October 4, 2010).   
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violence. Another crucial “spill-over” effect, of course, was to affirm (through civil records of 
births, marriages, and deaths) a sense of national identity. 
Importantly, these local government tasks were largely administrative and not, one might 
suspect, especially cumbersome, but they had revolutionary results, in terms of their “liberal” 
outcome. In the pre-democratic late seventeenth-century, British philosopher John Locke 
described the inextricable link between these very basic local government functions and—what 
later became—the Western interpretation of “political liberalism.” A reconsideration of Locke’s 
work reminds us that, while the role of democratic state leadership is undoubtedly a crucial 
consideration in democratic states, it is not only central government leaders that underlie liberal 
state practice. Citizens of liberal democratic states have historically been more closely linked 
with local government procedure, largely out of self-interest, and motivated by the security and 
protection of what Locke referred to as “the fruits of our labor.” Specifically, Locke argued that 
the input of labor into what nature has provided to all is what legitimately creates property.38  
Accordingly, within today’s liberal democracies there exists a practical connection 
between government institutions and the citizenry; what Louis Hartz once termed a “Submerged 
Lockean Consensus.”39 By this, Hartz meant that there was popular consensus within liberal 
states as to what political liberalism entails and what the role of government institutions should 
be; an interpretation that was first argued by the then radical Locke contra the political 
philosophy on governance then promoted by apologists of illiberal state practice, such as Sir 
Robert Filmer. Locke’s argument that government institutions should protect our “lives, liberties, 
and estates,” later interpreted as the protection of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” by 
Thomas Jefferson in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, is fundamental to liberal practice. 
The U.S. Declaration of Independence has often been interpreted as an important stepping-stone 
toward “democracy”; it might better be thought of as a crucial step towards today’s predominant 
view as to what political liberalism entails.  
The bounds of political liberalism remain a fundamental matter of policy and debate 
among liberal states but the fact remains that there is nearly universal agreement of this 
fundamental role of governing institutions in liberal democratic states. Few would counter, for 
example, the protection of our private property—again, viewed historically as the things that we 
work for, what Locke termed “the fruits of our labor”—as a fundamental right within liberal 
states. This interpretation of what political freedom entails remains an underlying principle in 
liberal practice and it can be argued that much of the Western “miracle” has relied on this as the 
basis of liberalism. Indeed, it can be argued that the realization of prosperity (Bates’ term) or 
liberalism (the policy concern of Zakaria and other proponents of freedom in today’s new 
democracies) is a kind of “chicken and egg” phenomenon where development via private 
enterprise—economic liberalism—can only occur once property (as Locke terms it “the things 
we work for”) is secure, i.e., once political liberalism is realized. Approaches to liberalism, 
however, remain mired in such vague notions as “End of History” rather than what it will 
                                                
38 See John Locke, “Of Property,” in Two Treatises On Government (1690; reprint, New York: Liberal Arts 
Press, 1952), 16–18. 
39 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1955). 
Moving Beyond “Illiberal Democracy” in Sub-Saharan Africa     13 
require: a more practical connection between governing institutions and the citizenry that 
emphasizes specific Lockean or other, locally defined, aims.40 The only arrangement that can be 
considered appropriate and just—part of any democratic hope—must include the collective 
expression of hopes, dreams, and desires of the local citizenry.41 As we enter into the twenty-
first century, many external actors remain tied to vague, often ideological, aims that are only 
shared with central government leaders. And, within the new democracies of sub-Saharan Africa, 
Lockean and local notions of political freedom remain largely misunderstood or scarcely 
expressed, due to the ongoing dysfunction of local governments—again, a problem that is largely 
a result of the priorities of external powers.  
For political liberalism to be realized in sub-Saharan Africa’s new democracies, local 
government institutions must assume, at a minimum, the administrative roles that they have had 
within today’s liberal democratic states such as maintaining civil records (births, marriages, 
deaths), titles to property, and a locally accountable security force; thus far, they have not. 
Instead, when local governance is mentioned in sub-Saharan African contexts, and for 
understandable reasons, the focus is on the soaring demand for other more visible public 
services. As witnessed during the campaign prior to 2006 local government elections in South 
Africa, candidates were quick to make unrealistic promises regarding the provision of improved 
public health care, education, and the like, while burgeoning issues that underlie improved local 
government administration were entirely neglected. In the party manifesto of the African 
National Congress (ANC) it was declared, for example, that their action plan would make local 
government “speed up the delivery of services.” Other parties, including the African Christian 
Democratic Party (ACDP) similarly focused on improving “service delivery.” While political 
organizers know all too well that this would appeal to the voting public, there is little visible 
support for the view that this will actually happen. Citizens of other early democracies never had 
these kinds of public service expectations and one can reasonably assume that the citizens of 
sub-Saharan Africa will only develop cynical attitudes toward “democracy” in this kind of 
atmosphere. 
To date, administrative challenges such as keeping track of titles to property, which 
generally falls under the heading of “land tenure” in the development literature, have been 
consistently marginalized in discussions of sub-Saharan state policy. To the extent that land 
tenure is maintained by government records, there is a tendency to rely on the records of central 
government authorities that often date back to the colonial era. These notoriously incomplete 
records require careful consideration if political liberalism of any kind is to be realized in sub-
Saharan Africa. And, certainly, in the short term there is no guarantee that the process of 
improved administrative austerity at the local government level will be without controversy. As 
countless observers have noted in the wake of the harsh property redistribution policies of the 
                                                
40 Francis Fukuyama, “End of History,” National Interest, No. 16, (Summer 1989).  
41 This pluralistic notion is not to be confused with the impossible ideal of fulfilling all of the hopes, dreams, 
and desires of all citizens. Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), rightly refers to the pluralistic ideal as “the promise of disharmony,” i.e., citizens 
must agree to disagree, at times, without resorting to violence. 
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Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, land records are indicative of a history of colonial rule and 
influence (what the Mugabe regime describes as “white” over “black” property ownership). 
Certainly, there is no intention here to condone Mugabe’s approach to the problem; it is an 
exceptional case on the African continent. But the historical result of having state power linked 
to property ownership has been to alienate many locals from the administrative processes that 
underlie land tenure. Historically, such procedures have been viewed as being linked to agents of 
the central government that, since well before the independence era, has generally been 
something that local citizens would rather avoid. Improved records of titles to property, and other 
forms of civil administration, would improve the relationship of citizens with their local 
governments, as has been the case in all liberal contexts. 
Today, contrary to the very basic expectations of local governments in early and pre-
democratic states, what is most often heard from the citizenry in sub-Saharan Africa is that the 
state ought to provide better services. It should come as no surprise, then, that the internal 
politics on local governance is characterized by general avoidance of the issue; because central 
government authorities view the needs of local government as an inept bottomless pit, local 
governance is rarely listed on the national policy agenda. Indeed, one is not surprised to see 
external actors, such as internationally recognized non-governmental organizations (INGOs), in 
rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa aiding local communities in a variety of ways. Whether these 
external actors are motivated by humanitarian concerns, the provision of “basic needs,” or an 
expectation as to what a modern welfare state might provide, there is virtually no support for 
what might be termed Lockean ideals at the local government level. Land tenure remains largely 
a concern of under-funded anthropologists, while internal and external policymakers frantically 
address more “pressing” policy matters. As the successes of the Grameen Bank have 
demonstrated throughout the world, central governments are not especially adept at responding 
to household level needs. In the interest of contemplating the prospects for strengthening local 
government institutions along locally defined lines (i.e., in an effort to promote political 
liberalism), the following discussion addresses the recent history of internal policies and debates 
regarding strengthening the local governments of one sub-Saharan African state—Zambia. This 
is followed by a consideration of changes of external policies, and how they might hinder or 
improve the prospects for strengthening local governments and finally, some of the lessons 
learned from the decentralization efforts in the Zambian case, are considered. 
Internal Politics: The Case of Zambia 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union it was clear to all that the patterns of Cold War patronage 
with African states were about to change forever. During that period, Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s 
leader after independence, had argued that Zambian citizens should adopt a policy of humanism 
(what was also called Kaundism). His argument for humanism, which he first expounded in his 
1962 book, Zambia Shall Be Free, was that with independence there would be a great many 
changes, perhaps even turmoil and chaos. Because the traditional village ways of life and culture 
would now be under constant threats of change, citizens should make every attempt to be kind 
toward one another during this tumultuous time. Certainly, the logic had appeal for many and it 
must be admitted that Zambia was relatively peaceful in the post-independence years, when 
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compared to her neighbors (Angola, former Zaire, and Mozambique).42 Like other sub-Saharan 
African central government powers, the Kaunda regime relied largely on the export of natural 
resources. The nationalized Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) was especially crucial 
to central government authorities as, for decades, copper exports alone accounted for over 80 
percent of Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings. As was the case during the colonial era, “the 
state” was therefore viewed as a stable resource for the few who were lucky enough to maintain 
ties; within this political power vacuum, local government was little more than an inconvenience.  
Coupled with central government ties with Cold War patrons, it should come as no 
surprise that throughout the Cold War period many looked to the central government as 
Zambia’s primary resource. But Kaunda’s central government “stability” was threatened by 
dramatic drops in the world price of copper during the 1970s. With the rising price of oil, the 
Kaunda government had little option but to borrow funds, notably from the IMF. In a pattern that 
was replicated throughout the developing world, Zambians found themselves with crippling and 
historic levels of debt. In 1987, Kaunda announced that he would not allow debt financing to 
exceed 10 percent of export earnings and attempted to “delink” from the IMF and World Bank. 
But by then it was already clear that Kaunda’s leadership would be challenged. In an atmosphere 
of growing critique against African forms of socialism, and growing support for 
“democratization,” a young union lawyer named Frederick Chiluba (who had previously been 
socialist), soon entered into a presidential race against Kaunda and his United National 
Independence Party (UNIP). As candidate for the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), 
Chiluba represented a growing group of African politicians who were now openly supportive of 
democracy and capitalism. In spite of protests by supporters of UNIP, Chiluba’s MMD won the 
election decisively, with 75.8 percent of the vote. 
In 1991, as had been the case post-independence, the prospects for democratization 
seemed great. This time there would be no Cold War rivalry. Now, it was clear to all that the 
future developmental path of African states would not and could not be that of the Soviets. The 
newly elected Frederick Chiluba remarked, for example: 
The significance of the collapse of communist states should not be underestimated. These 
events were critical, first because the Eastern European regimes and their constitutions 
had provided the model upon which the entire structure of government in Zambia’s 
Second Republic came to be based.… Second, the Soviet Union had provided aid to the 
one-party state in Zambia. A Soviet military attaché was accredited to the embassy in 
Lusaka [and] East German military instructors could be found in Zambia as recently as 
1988.43 
Following in a pattern that had begun during the colonial era, the Chiluba government 
maintained central government authority and control. But outside observers, notably donor states 
and INGOs, began to lobby for policies that would promote “democratization.” Importantly, the 
                                                
42 Zambia’s bookstores continue to sell books on Kaunda’s philosophy. A popular one was written by M.A. 
Ranganathan, The Political Philosophy of President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia (Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda 
Foundation, 1986). 
43 Frederick Chiluba, Democracy: The Challenge of Change (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1995), 49–52. 
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Lockean ideals of establishing local governments with the primary aims of protecting our “lives, 
liberties, and estates” were not the focus; rather, decentralization was viewed as an important 
step toward democratization. During the Chiluba era the term “democracy” was simply used as a 
kind of trump card for legitimacy, and local governing issues continued to be framed in terms of 
public services. Many involved in public health and education, in particular, argued that these 
basic services could be more efficiently provided at the local level through a gradual process of 
decentralization. 
In short order, the new regime’s Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) promised the 
“decentralization and strengthening of local government,” with task-based timetables, that were 
all presented to donor states in a comprehensive text, circulated in 1993. Passage of the PSRP 
was considered by many to be a remarkable event in Zambia’s political history as it was a policy 
direction that had been long fought for by proponents of decentralization.44 In the many 
discussions that led up to the 1993 PSRP, the 1980 Local Administration Acts that had aimed (on 
paper) at devolution of power from central government to Councils were openly criticized and 
considered a failure, if not an outright sham. This new policy, coupled with the historic break 
with the past—one that had been dominated by former President Kenneth Kaunda—offered 
Zambians reasons for democratic hope in the first few years of the Chiluba presidency. As 
supporters of Chiluba reminded eligible voters in 1991, “the hour had come,” and with the 1993 
passage of the PSRP, change was in the air.45 
But in the years that followed, specific tasks that had been listed in the PSRP’s Proposed 
Implementation Schedule, notably that the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) 
would complete a Plan for Decentralization by mid-1993, were clearly being delayed. Seeing 
that strong central government resistance to the PSRP remained, one of the primary proponents 
of decentralization in Zambia, the British-funded Local Government Support Project (LOGOSP) 
that had been formally initiated in March 1995, closed its doors in 1997. From 1995 to 1997, 
brand new white trucks with LOGOSP decals on the doors were a common sight on the roads of 
Zambia, particularly in the streets of Lusaka. But, seeing no real signs of political will to 
decentralize government authority and control, LOGOSP was to last just over two years.46 Since 
then, there have been no signs that there are any plans of having LOGOSP return. In response, 
Bennie Mwiinga, MP for the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), made every 
attempt to revamp LOGOSP through the support of other donor states. But his eleventh-hour 
                                                
44 By the early 1990s, proponents of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) were keenly aware of the 
difficulties faced in the aftermath of the 1980 Local Administration Reforms that had involved plans for extensive 
devolution of central government powers and functions to Councils. The hope was that, lessons learned, PSRP 
would be more effective. 
45 During the 1996 election, support for this view was indicated with an extended thumb and index finger to 
represent the hands of a clock reaching the hour. 
46 A newsletter was distributed in Zambia to report the progress of LOGOSP. “LOGOSP Launched!” was 
announced in the Local Government Support Project Newsletter, Issue No. 1, March 1995. In the January 1997 issue 
(No. 8) of that same newsletter, it was announced, “Running Out of Money!” 
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efforts proved unsuccessful.47 Mwiinga’s appeal for what he termed “bridging finance” was only 
considered as an attempt to keep the MLGH bureaucracy afloat and not linked, in any 
meaningful way, to implementation of the PSRP. Even the draft decentralization plan that was 
finally circulated in 1996 did not convince donors that central government leaders were taking 
the issue seriously; indeed, formal consideration of the plan by Parliament was to take another 
eight years.  
Zambia’s Ministry of Local Government and Housing’s Desperate 1997 Appeal to Donors 
In all fairness, Mwiinga’s 1997 appeal to donor states never really stood a chance. The only 
donor state that could have provided any substantive support to the MLGH was the United States 
(or, more specifically, the U.S. Agency for International Development) and, for a variety of 
reasons, USAID was not prepared to do so. As a leading donor state in Zambia, the consistent 
position of USAID/Zambia on decentralization is worth noting.  
Local Governance: A Non-Starter? 
First, beyond keeping “democracy and governance” low on this mission’s priority list, the task of 
strengthening local governments through decentralization was consistently portrayed as a non-
starter. Throughout the 1990s USAID officials were notably less optimistic to those from other 
donor states. Observing that there was little central government support for the task, the former 
Democracy and Governance Advisor of USAID/Zambia commented: “We simply see no 
political will to allow any sort of localization to take place,” adding, “the enabling environment 
is downright hostile.”48 Nor is there any indication that there will be any change in USAID’s 
position with regard to local governance in the near future. For example, in the summary of its 
Democracy and Governance Programme for Zambia in 2005, USAID makes no mention of local 
governance issues, or of decentralization efforts.49  
Aid as Obstacle: 
Second, USAID/Zambia is entirely dependent on the support of a home government that has 
been, relatively speaking, “anti-aid.” The open critique of aid was especially marked during the 
1980s and 1990s and is now commonplace in development circles; one could say, without 
exaggeration, that the United States has led the global campaign against development aid, to 
great effect. “Aid as obstacle” has since become the established “common wisdom” among 
                                                
47 Specifically, following the pull out of LOGOSP, the Hon. Bennie Mwiinga, MP Minister of Local 
Government and Housing held a meeting on June 13, 1997, with donors to request additional funds (what was 
termed “bridging finance.”). 
48 Personal correspondence with former DGA at USAID/Zambia, Miles Toder, dated September 27, 1999. 
49 See “Inputs, Outputs, Activities, FY 2005 Program,” at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ 
afr/zm.html. Decentralization of public services—notably public health—is regularly contemplated and debated 
among USAID officials, but on the whole, local government matters have not been part of Democracy and 
Governance activities. See Christopher LaMonica, Local Government Matters: The Case of Zambia (Saarbrücken: 
Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010). 
18     Christopher LaMonica 
donors; that is, it is generally accepted that aid only distorts the proper development of 
developing states.50 “Well-intentioned” donations of free food and clothing have proven to be 
powerful examples of how even well-intentioned aid can devastate the local entrepreneur. 
Specifically, such cases ask: How can local entrepreneurs possibly compete with an influx of 
free goods that are sent in the form of “aid”? 
Central Government Focus: 
Third, the Democracy and Governance (D/G) activities of USAID have historically centered on 
the observation of, and contact with, central government leaders. The incentive for altering this 
largely entrenched manner of conducting D/G activities remains minimal; rewards for having 
central government contacts remain higher than what they might be for establishing contacts out 
in the countryside.51 Indeed, during the Cold War, donor state missions in sub-Saharan Africa 
were expected to work with central government leaders—particularly as they were often pro-
socialist or avowedly Marxist. In the ideological climate of the Cold War it should come as no 
surprise, then, that USAID missions in the sub-Saharan African region had little difficulty in 
obtaining home support when submitting requests for funds. During those years, while Kaunda 
promoted Zambian Humanism, other state leaders developed what was considered unique forms 
of African Socialism, including most famously, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere (president of Tanzania 
from 1962–1985). Donor state missions from the West, in particular, were therefore cautious of 
openly criticizing such leaders, lest entire states be lost in a global chess-like battle among states 
that were considered either pro-Soviet or pro-West. Yet, as we progress into the twenty-first 
century, it is becoming abundantly clear that the post-Cold War world is dramatically different in 
that donor state critique of African state leaders occurs with much more ease and, as 
demonstrated, the use of aid to these same leaders is now openly put into question. 
Policy Without Implementation? The 2004 Decentralization Plan  
Finally, with the overall stance of donor states being hostile toward “aid,” USAID’s policy 
stance will likely have dramatic consequences for the future implementation of Zambia’s 2004 
National Decentralization Policy; without external funding of some kind, implementation of the 
policy itself will prove to be a non-starter. While there are other potential sources of financial 
support for this new policy, a consideration of USAID/Zambia’s development policies, as 
viewed through budget allocations, is crucial as USAID remains the largest single bilateral donor 
to Zambia, followed by the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, and Japan.52 In fact, a look at 
                                                
50 This was the title of a 1981 book by Frances Moore Lappé, Joseph Collins, and David Kinley, Aid As 
Obstacle: Twenty Questions about Our Foreign Aid and the Hungry (San Francisco, CA: Institute for Food and 
Development Policy, 1981).  
51 Based on personal observation while working with USAID/Zambia in 1997. With little incentive to venture 
into the countryside, D/G staff would stay for months at a time in Lusaka reporting on developments within the 
capital. 
52 See http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr/zm.html (accessed October 22, 2010). Overall donor 
assistance to Zambia totals about $310 million a year. 
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USAID/Zambia’s post-Cold War budget figures demonstrates the lack of will, on the part of 
USAID, to put resources into what is termed “Democracy and Governance.” For example, 
following in order of importance to USAID/Zambia, one typically finds the top two “Strategic 
Objectives” are Increased Competitiveness and Improved Health; Democracy and Governance 
has tended to receive around 5 percent of the overall annual budget.53  
External Politics: The Rapidly Changing Dynamics of Aid 
Following the 1980s, a period that has been considered by many a “lost decade” for Africa, U.S. 
policymakers made it abundantly clear that their policy priority for Africa was economic growth; 
improvements in other areas, including democratization, could only occur after successful rates 
of annual growth were achieved. Many now refer to this as a “development first, democracy 
later” approach to African development. Certainly, this was the logic behind what was dubbed 
the “End of Dependency Act of 1996” for Africa (H.R. 4198), that made specific reference to 
“sub-Saharan Africa’s lack of competitiveness in the global market.”54 Sponsored by Rep. Phil 
Crane (R-IN), Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY), and Jim McDermott (D-WA), the bill aimed at 
building “a market-oriented transition path for sub-Saharan Africa from dependency on foreign 
assistance to economic self-sufficiency.”55 Leading development economist Jeffrey Sachs, 
former Director of Harvard’s Center for International Development (formerly the Harvard 
Institute for International Development) and now Director for Columbia University’s Earth 
Institute, strongly supported the initiative. In February 1997 Sachs submitted a paper to the 
former speaker of the house, Newt Gingrich, which was then forwarded to members of the U.S. 
Congress, entitled “A New Partnership for Growth in Africa” that wholly supported the idea of 
having a new growth strategy for sub-Saharan Africa. In that paper Sachs called for an “initiative 
from the United States to work with other major donors to end aid to Africa as we know it.”56 
Turning his focus away from his consultations on structural reform in other parts of the world 
Sachs, now especially interested in African development, was regularly quoted as a supporter of 
the objectives in H.R. 4198, calling it a “new way forward for Africa” in the Financial Times and 
arguing in an interview with The Economist that “growth in Africa can be done.”57 Hearing that 
this was a viable plan to help Africa to grow, African-American leaders, following in the 
                                                
53 See http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/zm.html (accessed October 22, 2010). 
54 See: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h104-4198 (accessed October 22, 2010). 
55 See ibid.  H.R. 4198, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, September 26, 1996, entitled “A Bill to authorize a new 
trade and investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa,” p. 2.  
56 Jeffrey Sachs, “A New Partnership for Growth in Africa,” February 28, 1997. This paper was proudly 
presented by HIID Associate, Malcolm McPherson, in March 1997 at a Harvard development seminar that was 
attended by the author. At that seminar, McPherson indicated that the paper was the direct result of a chance 
encounter between Jeffrey Sachs and the former House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, at a Christmas party in December 
1996. Gingrich, it was explained, then passed the paper on to members of the U.S. Congress. 
57 Stephanie Flanders, “New Ways Forward for Africa: An Initiative to Aid the Sub-Sahara’s Development 
Deserves Serious Study,” Financial Times, April 14, 1997, and “Growth in Africa: It Can Be Done,” The Economist, 
June 26, 1996, 19–21.  
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footsteps of Rep. Charles Rangel, similarly supported the bill. As a senior member of the 
Congressional Black Caucus, and chief sponsor of the bill, Rangel argued that “at last, like other 
ethnic groups in America, African-Americans will be able to point to a special partnership that 
connects the United States to our ancestral homes.”58  
Despite the glaring fact that plans for this ‘special partnership’ included continued 
reductions in aid, opposition to the bill was minimal. By this time the consensus was that 
dependency on aid diminished the prospects for competition and, hence, economic growth. The 
lack of any real critique from lobbyists in Washington was largely due to the renaming of the 
initiative, from “End of Dependency Act” (which was understood to be a partisan, i.e., 
Republican initiative) to the more appealing “African Growth and Opportunity Act,” which 
received full bipartisan support. Ralph Nader’s group Public Citizen dutifully called on its 
members to “oppose the misnamed African Growth and Opportunity Act” but to no avail.59 In 
1999, with the full support of the Black Caucus, the House passed the renamed bill with a vote of 
309–110, followed by a 2000 Senate vote of 77–19.60 Since then, AGOA has remained the 
dominant policy stance towards sub-Saharan Africa, with direct consequences on USAID 
budgets. Indeed, the aforementioned pattern of U.S. leadership among donor states in the 
Zambian context is not likely to last as aid budgets (in thousands of U.S. dollars) have continued 
to decrease in recent years: FY 2004 ($49,487), FY 2005 ($28,297) and FY 2006 ($24,927).61 
Ongoing developments in the aftermath of AGOA, including statistics that demonstrate an 
increase in trade between the United States and Africa, are regularly posted on the new, and 
often cited, web-site http://www.agoa.gov. In December 2005, United States President George 
W. Bush expressed his hope that thirty-seven African states would be made “eligible” for 
“AGOA.62 Citing specific sections of AGOA, as well as the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, the 
president’s press release suggests that certain African states are “making continual progress” and 
considers the prospect for new AGOA designations for African states, i.e., “lesser developed 
beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries.”63  
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61 See http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/zm.html.  
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63 Ibid. 
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Ironically, of course, while this fundamental restructuring of aid to Africa is occurring 
within the U.S. policy circles, others involved in aid are simultaneously pushing for the United 
Nation’s Millennium Development Goals that specify the need for increased aid from donor 
states, to reach a minimum of 0.7 percent of GDP. Proponents of increased aid to Africa within 
OECD states have already run into tremendous resistance, particularly in United States contexts, 
as the prevailing wisdom remains critical of aid in general.64 What is particularly ironic, given 
Sachs’ aforementioned involvement in pushing for AGOA, is that he is now actively involved in 
the promotion of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (UNMDGs), working as special 
advisor to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon.65 Furthermore, in 2005, Sachs published a 
bestselling book entitled The End of Poverty that addressed his revised views on aid. Over the 
past few years, he has held many public lectures and interviews discussing his ideas.66 To him 
there is no inconsistency; economic growth must be the priority and (different from the AGOA 
approach) aid can help to make that happen. For this later, pro-aid policy stance, Sachs has 
received tremendous support. In fact, all 192-member states have agreed to the highly publicized 
eight UNMDGs. 
The overarching goal, argues Sachs, is to end “extreme poverty” by 2015.67 And again, 
much of his concern focuses specifically on sub-Saharan Africa. This goal cannot be achieved, 
he argues, by simply cutting aid across the board but through a careful consideration of the 
unique circumstances in which certain developing states now find themselves. While still 
arguing that developing state policy needs to welcome market liberalization, Sachs now focuses 
on other factors that impact economic growth, such as geography; while some countries have 
been blessed with access to international markets others, particularly landlocked countries, have 
had a difficult time accessing world markets and this has translated into increased operating 
costs. Further, the initial income level of a country may be low, and that lack of capital has an 
adverse impact on prospects for growth. Such circumstances, Sachs argues, may warrant a write-
off, or easing of, debt burdens, etc.68 In other words, many of the circumstances that now 
adversely impact the immediate prospects for the economic growth of most sub-Saharan African 
states need to be addressed through a variety of development strategies, not by simply cutting aid 
budgets across the board. Aid can be used in effective ways that aim at promoting economic 
growth he seems to argue, contrary to prevailing wisdom. What needs to be fostered are the 
fundamentals of any economy: the support and training of labor, the development of capital, 
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66 Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). 
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management know-how, and the like. With the view that labor is an abundant and underutilized 
resource in many developing countries, Sachs has made a concerted effort to point to public 
health concerns, notably AIDS, as an impediment to growth. While it might seem difficult to 
refute Sachs’ more comprehensive approach to promoting economic growth, his views remain 
marginalized among many aid policy makers. The recent popularity of Thomas L. Friedman’s 
book, The World Is Flat, is testament to the ongoing support for the view that, in this era of 
globalization, opportunities are available to us all and that, accordingly, aid can only be 
considered a handout.69 In fact, during his book tour for The End of Poverty, Sachs made a point 
of criticizing Friedman’s perspective. The question remains as to what direction the Washington 
Consensus will take on the matter. 
It is partly as a result of Sachs’ new perspective on the subject of aid, and global support 
for the UNMDGs, that the debate as to whether aid must necessarily hinder developmental 
patterns, including the development of free markets, has returned. For now, the notion that aid 
can be put to good use—supporting business initiative, assisting the workforce in training and 
education, and helping to alleviate glaring public health concerns—remains controversial. And 
the links between these issues and political development, not to mention any improved prospects 
for liberal political practice, remain difficult to ascertain at best. The question remains as to how 
all of these political debates on aid, that are largely outside of sub-Saharan Africa, will affect the 
prospects for improved political development within sub-Saharan African states. 
There can be little doubt that the external policy debates have a profound impact on 
policy direction within sub-Saharan African states. For instance, decentralization in Zambia, like 
other policy initiatives, has been largely a donor-driven enterprise. While the leading donor to 
Zambia, USAID, has had other priorities, Britain and other donors have consistently pushed for 
decentralization plans including, notably, the increased “capacity” of local governing authorities. 
The push for political change, from donor states (external actors) must be taken into account 
when attempting to understand recent trends in sub-Saharan State policy. While African state 
leaders may voice contempt for such ideas, Africanists such as Jennifer Widener have 
consistently argued that in sub-Saharan Africa “political openings usually take place only in 
conjunction with international pressure.”70 This was certainly the case with the long delayed 
approval of Zambia’s National Decentralization Policy in 2004. While USAID took little 
interest, other donor states lobbied hard for passage of the draft policy.71 Advocating a new 
policy direction, of course, is a delicate issue but Zambia’s central government leaders have long 
been accustomed to the idea that donor state funding is linked to certain policy initiatives. 
Indeed, any contempt that some Zambian leaders and citizens might have for such external 
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pressures is largely due to what is now widely perceived as the donor state’s “self-serving” 
interests during the Cold War. “Why else,” goes the refrain of many Zambians today, “would 
donor states be cutting their foreign aid budgets?”  
Conclusion: Recalling the Significance of Local Government Institutions 
In the geographically vast regions of sub-Saharan Africa, the proximity of government 
authorities can play a crucial role. Largely due to the history of capital-centered politics and the 
“national” formulation of policy, many have considered local governments to be a burden or 
even a luxury. To the extent that local government was considered by colonial administrators, it 
was to emphasize the maintenance of “order” (through Indirect Rule, Assimilation, or other) and 
not to establish local government institutions that had, as their principal aim, the maintenance 
and security of local property. Moreover, due to the colonial history of sub-Saharan African 
states, local authorities have been viewed as agents of “the state” by local citizens. In these 
circumstances, “the state” was something to be avoided and at all costs; this legacy remains. To 
this day, it certainly is not assumed that a local government authority acts in the interest of the 
local citizen. Much of this can be explained in terms of colonial history, and the often corrupt 
practices that continued during the era of “neo-colonialism.” This paper has argued that a careful 
consideration of the limited roles of local government authorities in liberal democratic contexts 
could be revealing. Within that context, local governance played a largely unsung but crucial role 
in expanding liberal practice. At least initially, citizens had limited demands. One of the most 
fundamental functions of local governments in liberal states, then and now, has been the 
protection of the “fruits of our labor,” that is, our property. 
As local—historically agrarian—productivity improved, administrative ties with central 
government were improved, with the understanding that there could be positive-sum gains to be 
had by those involved. In the sub-Saharan context, central government leaders were direct 
beneficiaries of colonial and Cold War ties, to the detriment of local government development. 
The relationship then, has been viewed as “top-down,” zero-sum (competing for limited 
resources) and antagonistic. By contrast, in liberal democratic states, there have been political 
debates over the appropriate balance of local-central state authorities, but the largely cooperative 
connection has always existed.72 By contrast, in the sub-Saharan African context, colonial 
history and its aftermath led to the development of governing institutions that consistently 
favored centralized over local forms of governance.  
Democracy then, in all historical contexts, is a process, not an event. In the post-Cold 
War environment it must now be openly acknowledged that this has been the case in all 
democratic states of the world; political freedoms that have become synonymous with 
democratic practice certainly did not apply to all residents of the early United States, for 
example, that included a sizable slave population and systematically excluded women. The 
inclusion of these groups—unquestionable improvements in democratic practice—took place 
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over time. Such views are now being expressed, in policy circles, as part of the challenge that 
new democracies must now face.73 The argument that this process takes time may offer little 
solace to those anxious to implement liberal democratic practice in new democracies. But these 
kinds of historical comparisons that focus on the practical underpinnings of liberalism 
demonstrate the crucial role of local governance.  
There are several important lessons to be learned from the internal and external politics 
that surround the decentralization efforts in Zambia of the past decade. First, the pressures from 
international or external actors for decentralization are not uniform. Evidence of this can be 
found by comparing the types of donor state support for the decentralization policies pursued by 
the Chiluba, Mwanawasa and Banda governments, including those behind the 1993 Public 
Service Reform Programme and, now, the 2004 National Decentralization Policy. Indeed, a more 
careful consideration of donor support for political change in Zambia demonstrates clear 
differences among donors as to what the policy priorities should be, based largely on dominant 
political beliefs among donor states themselves. Broadly speaking, for example, USAID tends to 
prioritize privatization, increased competition, and business development, while the 
Scandinavian states tend to support more coordination of aid efforts and civil society 
development projects. Britain and Germany, as well as international organizations such as the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, tend to emphasize the 
importance of institutional “capacity building.” This can also be said of CARE International in 
Zambia and other international NGOs that work extensively on the development of rural 
agriculture and of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). Over time, donor states develop 
reputations among Zambians (and within the local development community) for supporting 
various types of development initiatives.74 
Second, the policies of individual donor states are a reflection of the policy debates that 
take place within their respective home governments. The parallels between the 1960s expansion 
of foreign aid and welfare programs, on the one hand, and the 1980s contractions of both, on the 
other hand, are worthy of note. In the 1960s, while Western states vowed to end poverty at home 
through a host of new welfare programs, lending institutions such as the World Bank provided 
unprecedented levels of loans to developing states throughout the world. In retrospect, the 
parallel is clear: the prevailing policy aim was to eradicate poverty through the promotion of 
certain domestic state and international development policies. These loans continued to expand 
until the 1982 LDC Debt Crisis, prompted by Mexico’s refusal to pay debts, and similar refusals 
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only continued throughout the now indebted world. A good way to identify a donor state’s 
position on aid, therefore, is through a careful consideration of each respective state’s domestic 
politics. In 1992, United States President Clinton announced “the end of welfare as we know it”; 
the AGOA initiative is now applying the same logic of “ending dependency” to foreign aid. As 
Steven Radelet has argued: “the Clinton administration’s African Growth and Opportunity Act, 
now embraced by the Bush administration, should hardly be trumpeted as the United States’ 
‘giving’ something to poor countries, since the legislation only slightly reduces existing barriers 
and leaves significant obstacles untouched.”75 
Third, the method of pursuing decentralization over the past decade points to the extreme 
imbalances of wealth and power among the various players involved in the process. Discussions 
with consultants, development practitioners, and Zambia’s central government staff, led this 
observer to the conclusion that Zambia’s decentralization policies are pursued largely to appease 
the concerns of international actors (particularly donor states and the dominant lending 
institutions of the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank). As central government ministries struggle 
to maintain control, they are constantly under pressure to mention “decentralization” as one of 
their new policy goals. Unrealistic target dates for decentralization and “strengthening of local 
government,” with little follow-up in policy implementation, have thus far been the result.76 
Finally, decentralization is but one of the many goals among international actors that 
have constant, and growing, budget constraints. As the international funds made available during 
the Cold War gradually disappear, and despite the political will for continued centralized control, 
decentralization nevertheless occurs; this demonstrates the simple fact that a continued flow of 
resources is required to maintain central government control. While there are likely a variety of 
reasons for the passing of the 2004 National Decentralization Policy in Zambia, the combined 
pressures of privatizing ZCCM and decreasing donor aid have left central government authorities 
with few remaining options but to relinquish some control. But the immediate results of 
decentralization are likely to be grim. As those involved in decentralization will readily admit, 
local government institutions throughout Zambia have little hope of coping with the many new 
challenges that they face in the shorter term. 
All the while, amidst a lingering ideological understanding of “democracy,” the liberal 
underpinnings of democratic states that began, historically, at the local level, remain outside of 
both internal and external policy debates. The new challenges of local governments, as they are 
portrayed in decentralization plans, have more to do with the provision of public services 
(supply) than with what had been promoted, most famously, by either Locke or Rousseau—
administrative tasks linked to the maintenance of civil records (such as births, marriages, and 
deaths) and records of title to private property. As mentioned, Africanist Robert Bates reminds us 
of another, most fundamental, concern that did lead to local political development in history: a 
focus on protection from violence and, in turn, an improved ability to plan for the future. In 
today’s newly declared “democracies” of sub-Saharan Africa, all of these ideas must be 
considered more carefully, in comparative historical perspective, with a special eye toward 
                                                
75 Steven Radelet, “Bush and Foreign Aid,” Foreign Policy, September/October 2003, 115–16. 
76 As demonstrated in the aftermath of the 1993 PSRP. 
26     Christopher LaMonica 
internal and external pressures. Certainly, within today’s liberal democratic states, there does 
exist what Louis Hartz termed a “submerged Lockean consensus.” As liberal democratic state 
citizens promote one or another policy in developing country contexts, they ought to think harder 
about the practical underpinnings of liberal practices at home, as well as today’s remarkable 
opportunities to promote liberalism in more practical, less ideological ways, than we all recently 
experienced. It would be hard to imagine a liberal democratic citizen who would oppose the 
notion of having local government institutions that administer civil records and titles to private 
property at home; yet few of those same liberal democratic citizens would today view these tasks 
as pressing issues in developing country contexts. Instead, as argued above, liberal democratic 
citizens, that are participants in the external debate that so profoundly affects sub-Saharan 
African state policy tend to focus on:  
1) Economic development first, democracy later77;  
2) Vague, often idealistic notions (at ideological extremes, a Marxist left and “patriotic” 
right that emphasize the “rising-up” of the masses) of “civil society”;  
3) A desperate quest for the provision of public services; or  
4) Remaining, Cold War, and largely ideological, notions of “democracy”—often 
packaged as “freedom” without any real policy meaning other than AGOA-like 
(economic liberalization/free-trade) aims.  
Even a cursory look at the internal politics of any sub-Saharan African state clearly 
demonstrates the continued marginalization of local government concerns. And, for the majority 
of Africanists, central government observation (usually bad news, with moments of ill-founded 
optimism) still takes the place of more careful analysis. The result is a kind of development 
consensus on local governance among external and internal actors: it is a non-starter. 
All the while, well outside of the largely elitist debates that affect development policy, 
there continues to be a seemingly desperate attempt by many anthropologists to include peoples 
in the ongoing process of land privatization. But the gains being made in this area have been 
hampered by the general perception that, as anthropologist Diana Hunt remarks, “external 
interventions to privatize land rights are usually inappropriate and likely to remain so.”78 Indeed, 
since the 1990s, any of the “aid policies” that external actors might like to promote are now 
deemed an “intervention” by many African leaders and, as such, are more openly questioned. 
Given the dramatic and often negative effects that external actors have had on the overall welfare 
of African states in history, is it any wonder? For the time being the prevailing logic among 
donors of the post-Cold War is that “aid” of any kind is bad and policy change must come from 
within. Could the non-questioning, non-conditional Chinese approach, so criticized by a growing 
number of western Africanists, be an easier option for today’s central government leaders? If so, 
we may look back on the Cold War as a period of lost opportunities; rather than promote 
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political liberalism, we were caught-up in our own ideological battle that was then, as now, of 
great relevance to us (scholars, politicians, and donor state practitioners) and of virtually no 
significance to the average sub-Saharan African state citizen. Looking back on the optimistic 
words of Richard Joseph and Carol Lancaster in the 1990s, it looks like we were so very close, 
but since then seem to have lost our focus on what really matters—not the individual books and 
careers of well paid pessimists, not “democracy” per se (the formal process of elections), but a 
locally defined “liberal democracy.”  
With the end of Cold War patronage and the break of central government links to 
nationalized companies like ZCCM, one could optimistically conclude that the era of virtually 
complete control of the central government over all matters of public policy is coming to an end. 
But to make such a conclusion one must believe that some other form of policy making, to 
involve more local authorities and control, will take its place. Internal and external actors can 
play a crucial role in helping to assure that this does occur and that at least some of the focus is 
placed on the administrative tasks that underlie Lockean notions of political liberalism. 
Policymakers must also keep in mind that, in the wake of democratic promise of over one decade 
ago, the average Zambian citizen is likely to view all of this as a largely theoretical debate; on 
the ground, the reality of institutional reforms that are still scheduled to take place in the 
aftermath of the 2004 Decentralization Plan will likely be continued hardship for millions. 
Hopefully, we will soon get beyond the point of being told that strengthening local government 
institutions does not matter—or in the Zambia case, that it cannot yet be implemented. A more 
careful consideration, in policy circles, of local government function is crucial. In fact, the 
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